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Abstract
Human social interactions are regulated by moral norms that define individual obligations
and rights. These norms are enforced by punishment of transgressors and reward of follow-
ers. Yet, the generality and strength of this drive to punish or reward is unclear, especially
when people are not personally involved in the situation and when the actual impact of their
sanction is only indirect, i.e., when it diminishes or promotes the social status of the pun-
ished or rewarded individual. In a real-life study, we investigated if people are inclined to
anonymously punish or reward a person for her past deeds in a different social context. Par-
ticipants from three socio-professional categories voted anonymously for early career violin-
ists in an important violin competition. We found that participants did not punish an immoral
violin candidate, nor did they reward another hyper-moral candidate. On the contrary, one
socio-professional category sanctioned hyper-morality. Hence, salient moral information
about past behavior did not elicit punishment or reward in an impersonal situation where the
impact of the sanction was indirect. We conclude that contextual features play an important
role in human motivation to enforce moral norms.
Introduction
Moral norms are ubiquitous in human societies. They dictate individual obligations and rights
in a variety of domains related to harm, care, fairness, reciprocity, loyalty, respect for authority
or purity [1]. Moral norms can be enforced by punishing transgressors and rewarding followers
[2–5]. Such reward and punishment may contribute to enforce norms in various ways. The
most direct way is a stick and carrot education of the punished or rewarded individuals [2]. In
a more indirect way, social influence [6,7] and in particular role models [8–10] are known to
impact on human norm compliance. Reward and punishment promote or diminish the social
status of individuals, and thereby influence who becomes powerful and/or plays a role model
in the society. Hence, by punishing immoral individuals and rewarding moral individuals, peo-
ple may collectively reinforce common moral norms. Punishment and reward can be formal–
i.e. executed by an institutionalized authority–or informal–i.e. applied by individual citizens in
a decentralized manner [11].
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Many studies on human morality assume that humans are intrinsically motivated–i.e. have
some built-in inclinations–to enforce the moral norms they adhere to by punishing norm-
transgressors and rewarding norm-followers. This assumption can be found in moral philoso-
phy writings [12–14] and in empirical studies in economics [15–17], anthropology [18], social
psychology [19–21], or neuroscience [22–24].
However, the generality and strength of this inclination to enforce social norms remain
unclear. In particular, do humans perform unconditional moral norm enforcement? By this,
we mean do humans have a propensity to punish immoral and reward moral behavior even in
the absence of additional non-moral incentives such as prospects for future cooperation, repu-
tation or revenge? And do they also punish and reward past immoral or moral deeds in situa-
tions that are not directly linked to these deeds?
Laboratory experiments indicate that norm violation triggers punishment from outside
observers–third-party–who are not directly affected by the violation: in many experiments, a
fraction of anonymous third-party participants punish uncooperative behavior and reward
cooperation at some personal cost, although they could ignore the moral information [15,25–
27]. In contrast, no conclusive evidence for costly punishment was found in systematic surveys
of anthropological field data [28]. An increasing number of studies indicate that informal
moral norm enforcement is conditional: it requires concerns for both norm compliance and
personal interests such as direct benefit or reputation [29–35].
To evaluate the generality and strength of the propensity to punish or reward, experimental
studies in real-life settings are needed. In a previous study, we assessed whether anonymous
judges in a violin competition were inclined to vote against a candidate that was described as
immoral–such a vote is a form of punishment because it hinders the career of the candidate
[36]. We found that two socio-professional categories–high school and police–ignored the
moral information when voting, while a third category–teacher–voted against the immoral
candidate.
This result provided evidence against an unconditional inclination to punish immoral
behavior and raised three questions. First, did teachers–the only socio-professional category
who punished–enforce the moral norm solely because of the immoral character of the candi-
date, or because of other non-moral consideration? Second, would the three socio-professional
categories react differently to other types of immoral behaviors? Third, were most participants
reluctant to penalize the immoral violinist because such punishment is a form of harm-doing?
Indeed, recent data indicate that humans may be more inclined to enforce moral norms by
rewarding moral behavior than by punishing immoral behavior [37,38]. Thus, it is of interest
to investigate whether participants are more likely to reward a hyper-moral candidate by voting
for her than to penalize an immoral candidate by voting against her.
Here, we perform a novel series of experiments to examine if participants anonymously
punish or reward the violinist for a past immoral or moral behavior that she performed in a dif-
ferent social context. We use the same socio-professional categories of participants and the
same violin competition setting than in our previous experiment [36], but we vary the content
of moral information. The two new scenarios include an immoral and a hyper-moral behavior.
These scenarios allow us to examine the extent to which unconditional moral sanctions or
rewards are used in an impersonal anonymous situation.
Material and Methods
Participants
Participants were students from three types of schools located in French-speaking Switzerland:
1) preparatory schools for future teachers (n = 44; 3 classes from 2 schools; 80% female; mean
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age = 23, SD = 3.97), 2) advanced high schools (n = 94; 6 classes from 2 schools; 59% female;
mean age = 18, SD = 1.18), and 3) preparatory school for future police officers (n = 109; 1 class;
17% female; mean age = 24, SD = 3.31). Two students (one police and one teacher) were dis-
carded from the analysis for reasons detailed below. Our sample size reflects the availability of
local classes to participate in the experiment.
Ethics Statement
Before conducting the experiment in the teacher, police and high schools, we explained the
whole test procedure to the relevant authorities and professors and obtained from them, verbal
consent and organizational support. By design, throughout the music competition procedure,
participants were unaware of contributing to a scientific study. Votes and questionnaires were
completed anonymously: neither fellow participants nor experimenters knew for whom indi-
vidual participants voted. After the experiment, we organized debriefing sessions in which we
informed participants of their involvement in a scientific experiment, and asked them for ver-
bal consent to use the data. None of the participants expressed discomfort or asked to withdraw
their data from the study and we recorded this information in our test notebook. We did not
ask for written consent because we considered that overall, the test procedure was not more
invasive than an anonymous opinion survey. This test and consent procedure has been fully
approved by our local ethics committee: “Comission cantonale d’éthique de la recherche sur
l’être humain”, University of Lausanne.
Procedure
We used the same cover story as in Clavien et al. [36]. Briefly, in place of an ordinary class les-
son, participants were involved in the final phase of a music competition. The experimenters,
disguised as representatives of a music company, entered the classroom and asked participants
to act as music judges in a violin competition (for detailed test procedure and materials, see
Clavien et al. 2012, supplemental material).
To avoid reputation effects participants were informed in advance that the voting procedure
was entirely anonymous. Each participant listened to three recordings of an excerpt from a
Mozart Violin Concerto using a computer and headphones. The first recording was from a
professional musician (Franco Gulli) and served to familiarize the participants with the music
excerpt. The next two recordings were filmed recordings of two pre-selected candidates playing
the same Mozart excerpt. Both candidates were female violinists with similar physical appear-
ance and whose faces were blurred. Both were described as finishing students from a European
music school. Participants received additional information about the two candidates from
short interviews of the candidates’music professor (see S1 File). The professor provided techni-
cal information about the two candidates’ general playing skills, and social information such as
opinions about how well each candidate is integrated in her class. Participants were told that
the winning candidate would be awarded a record deal, which represents a significant career
improvement.
To test whether participant’s voting behavior was influenced by moral information, we
designed three treatments (referred to as control, immoral and hyper-moral, respectively) that
only differed in the content of the social information about the candidates provided in the pro-
fessor’s interview (see S1 File). In the control treatment participants (teacher, n = 22; high
school, n = 32; police, n = 36) heard neutral information about the social character of each can-
didate (both candidates are described as nice and normal persons). In the immoral treatment
participants (teacher, n = 22; high school, n = 30; police, n = 36) heard that the more talented
candidate had a criminal record for selling drugs and still practiced this illicit activity–we
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hypothesized that participants would categorize such activity as immoral because drug-dealers
earn money by selling harming substances–, whereas the less talented candidate was described
as a normal person. In the hyper-moral treatment participants (high school, n = 32; police, n =
37) heard that the less talented candidate was very helpful towards fellow students and pro-
vided free music lessons to poor citizens whereas the more talented candidate was described as
a normal person. We associated the immoral information to the more talented candidate and
the hyper-moral information to the less talented candidate with the aim to generate a conflict
between judgment of musical achievement and moral judgment, thus making the decision to
punish/reward more salient. We did not test the hyper-moral treatment on the teacher category
because we had a smaller number of participants in this socio-professional category.
In all treatments each candidate was randomly associated with one of two sequences of
technical information of similar content–i.e. professor’s opinion about candidates’ playing
skills. Moreover, because the order in which candidates are presented influences people’s
choices [36] we randomized the order in which participants viewed the two candidates in all
treatments.
After observing the musical performances and professor interviews, the participants voted
for one candidate. Participants were then asked to report their gender, age, what factors played
a role in their voting decision (open comment box), and what style of music they listen to regu-
larly: among various proposed choices, they could select “classic”. To check whether partici-
pants viewed the important information (music and professor’s interview), the test material
included an automatic mouse click tracking system. After all participants had completed the
questionnaires we revealed to them that they had participated in an experiment. All but one
participants reported to have believed the cover story and were convinced that their vote had
an impact on the candidates’ career advancement. The single participant who failed to believe
the cover story and reported it in the questionnaire was discarded from the analysis. One addi-
tional participant who refused to vote because the professors’ interview would have biased the
choice was also discarded.
Data analysis
To test whether the two types of moral information impact voting behavior overall or differ-
ently in the three socio-professional categories, we analyzed separately two datasets: the
“immoral dataset” which includes all teacher, high school and police participants allocated to
the control and to the immoral treatments and the “hyper-moral dataset” which includes all
high school and police participants allocated to the control and to the hyper-moral treatments.
For each dataset, we used generalized linear models with a binomial distribution and included
as fixed factors the socio-professional category, moral treatment (control, immoral, hyper-
moral), technical information about the two candidates’ general playing skills, viewing order of
candidates, and interest in classical music. We did not include the gender because it was associ-
ated with the socio-professional category (chi-square test of independence, p< 0.05), but con-
trolled for the effect of gender in separate analyses (see below). We limited interactions
between factors to second order interactions and sequentially simplified the full models (using
AIC and chi-square likelihood ratio test for nested models) by removing non-significant effects
(p> 0.05), beginning with highest-order interactions until we obtained a final model.
In a second series of analyzes, to test for possible effects of gender, we repeated the same
procedure separately in each category (teacher, high school and police) for the immoral and
hyper-moral treatments. In these subset analyses we included gender, moral treatment, techni-
cal information about candidates, viewing order of candidates, and interest in classical music
as fixed factors.
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To evaluate the risk of a Type II error linked to non-significant results, we investigated with
a power test whether our comparison groups (e.g. treatment versus control groups, women ver-
susmen) are sufficiently large to capture 0.2 to 0.25 differences in votes for the best candidate.
To calculate the power of our analyses, we used the actual group sizes, we always assumed a
medium effect size (h = 0.5) [39], and a significance level of 0.05.
Results
The moral information had very little impact on voting behavior (Fig 1; Tables A & B in S1
File). Participants voted as much for the more talented candidate when she was described as
immoral or normal (one-sided power analysis of the “immoral dataset”: power = 0.92). Partici-
pants did not favor the less talented candidate when she was described as hyper-moral as com-
pared to normal (one-sided power analysis of the “hyper-moral dataset”: power = 0.88;
including the high school subset only: power = 0.52). On the contrary, participants from the
police school voted significantly less often (25% less votes) for the hyper-moral candidate than
for the candidate described as normal, suggesting punishment of the hyper-moral candidate
(GLM on full hyper-moral dataset: interactions between moral information and socio-profes-
sional categories: z = -3.02, p = 0.003; GLM on police subset of hyper-moral dataset: moral
information: z = 2.381, p = 0.017).
All participants listened to the music excerpts. Most participants (95% police, 96% teacher,
98% high school) listened to the professors’ interview. We estimate that it takes 12’ to listen
once to all the filmed recordings, and about 4’ to complete the questionnaire. Participants’
mean time to complete the task was 18’30. The extra time spent on the task is due to the fact
that many participants played the music recordings several times before voting. In total 95%
Fig 1. Effect of moral information on third-party observers in a real-life situation. Proportions of votes
for the most talented candidate among teacher, high school and police students. Grey bars correspond to the
control condition in which both candidates were described as similarly nice, normal persons. Black bars
correspond to the immoral treatment condition in which the most talented candidate was described as
immoral (she has a criminal record for selling drugs) and the less talented candidate was described as
normal. White bars correspond to the hyper-moral treatment in which the most talented candidate was
described as normal whereas the less talented candidate was described as hyper-moral (she is a very helpful
person and provides free music lessons in poor city areas). The only significant effect of moral information
was a tendency to vote against the hyper-moral candidate in the police category. Significance levels (GLM):
** = p < 0.01, n.s. = p > 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150388.g001
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of participants left written comments in the questionnaire explaining why they preferred the
candidate they voted for. This indicates that participants were actively involved as violin
judges. Only 14% of the comments referred to the social character of the candidates, indicating
that most participants did not consciously take the social information as a relevant decision
factor.
Overall, the participants did not mind receiving information about the candidates’ social
character, and they believed this information. The participants could perceive that the profes-
sor’s opinion might bias their vote, but only 5 of them (2%) expressed discomfort about this
fact in their written comments. None expressed doubts about the veracity of the professor’s
information. Participants’ reaction during the debriefing session confirmed this point: they
mainly laughed at their own credulity.
In line with previous findings [36], the viewing order affected participants’ judgment
(Tables A & B in S1 File). Participants voted more often for the candidate presented second
(41% mean increase of votes for the best candidate when presented second; GLM on full
immoral dataset: z = -4.938, p< 0.001; GLM on full hyper-moral dataset: z = -4.27, p< 0.001).
This bias was significant in each category of participants (GLM on high school subset of
immoral dataset: z = -2.047, p = 0.041; high school subset of hyper-moral dataset: z = -2.868,
p = 0.004; police subset of immoral dataset: z = -3.282, p = 0.001; police subset of hyper-moral
dataset: z = -3.272, p = 0.001; teacher subset of immoral dataset: z = -2.866, p = 0.004).
Future police officers were less successful at identifying the more talented candidate (GLM
immoral dataset: z = 3.016, p< 0.003; Fig 1; Table A in S1 File). The other factors we tested
for–technical information about candidates (two-sided power analysis of the “immoral
dataset”: power = 0.92), interest in classical music (two-sided power analysis of the “immoral
dataset”: power = 0.88) and gender (two-sided power analysis including high school dataset:
power = 0.66)–had no significant impact on votes.
Discussion
In our real-life experiment, we found no evidence for a propensity to punish immoral behavior
or reward hyper-moral conduct in an anonymous impersonal context. The participants–future
teachers, future police officers and high school students–believed that their anonymous vote
would impact the career of violinist candidates in a music competition, granting the winner
with fame and an increase in social status. Hence, they could have used their vote as an indirect
way to enforce moral norms. However the three categories of participants did not penalize the
immoral or support the hyper-moral candidate with their votes. To the contrary, police partici-
pants disfavored the hyper-moral candidate.
Two features of the situation may contribute to explain why participants did not enforce
moral norms in our experiment. First, the reported immoral or hyper-moral behavior had
been perpetrated in a social context that was not related to the music competition, making the
moral information less salient or relevant. It is thus possible that the participants were able to
ignore–or failed to notice–the extraneous information about unrelated activity. Second, partici-
pants might have had difficulties in evaluating the personal and social effects of their sanction.
Although these two features may contribute to explain the absence of sanction against immoral
behavior in our experiment, they did not prevent police participants from voting against the
hyper-moral candidate.
We also found that a factor devoid of any musical content influenced participants’ judg-
ment. The viewing order had a strong influence on the voting behavior, with a 41% increase of
votes for a candidate when she was viewed second. The impact of viewing order on votes has
been documented in other experiments [36,40].
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These new results indicate that occasional punishing behavior depends on context. In a pre-
vious study, teachers punished the candidate who repeatedly behaved immorally in her music
school–for example, she mistuned a colleague’s instrument just before a concert [36]. Here,
instead of judging an undisciplined violin student in a school context, teachers had to judge a
violin student involved in criminal drug selling perpetrated outside of the school context. We
found that teachers tolerated the latter form of immorality. Their contrasted reaction may indi-
cate that teachers view criminal drug selling as morally acceptable. However, it seems more
likely that they were influenced by an additional contextual factor when they punished. Teach-
ers may be more motivated to sanction someone who behaves immorally in their usual domain
of expertise, possibly because they are trained to teach norms to students or act against students
who disturb their working environment.
Overall we found little evidence for punishment or reward in a setting where actors had no per-
sonal incentive to intervene and where the sanction reinforced moral norms in an indirect manner,
by affecting the social status of the norm follower or transgressor. The high school and police
socio-professional categories did not punish the immoral behavior of the violinist whatever the
context, while the teachers only punished in the school scenario, but not in the drug-dealing sce-
nario. Overall, the participants did not reward moral behavior or sanction immoral behavior in
this particular social setting. It is possible that the participants did not feel legitimate to reward
hyper-moral behavior or sanction immoral behaviors that had been performed in a different social
context, or that they did not perceive the actual impact of their vote on social norm propagation.
Finally, we tested the plausible hypothesis that participants may be reluctant to penalize the
immoral violinist because such punishment is a form of harm-doing. We found that participants
did not reward the hyper-moral candidate, and thus were not more likely to reward moral behav-
ior than to penalize immoral behavior. This suggests that the absence of reaction to moral infor-
mation in our previous experiment was not due to an avoidance of harm-doing [37].
To sum up, our results indicate that humans may be influenced by moral information, but
in specific situations. They do not unconditionally punish or reward past immoral or moral
behavior performed in a different social context. Additional conditions to salient moral infor-
mation are needed, such as reputation building [30,35], revenge feelings [41], effect on future
interactions [42], professional habitus, or clear opportunity to educate or impact on the behav-
ior of the sanctioned individual.
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